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Article 7

LAWYERS' MALPRACTICE:

A COMPARATIVE APPRAISAL

Dauid 0. Haughey*
I.

Introduction

If we were to play the psychologists' word association game with a representative group of lawyers, most of them would probably associate the term
"malpractice" with physicians and surgeons. Such responses would be entirely
appropriate because certainly the law of professional malpractice has developed
overwhelmingly in the field of medicine, as compared to other professions. Very
likely the average physician knows more about professional malpractice than the
average lawyer, and a very great many of them have acquired their familiarity
with the law of professional malpractice from bitter personal experience. The
appellate court reports in every jurisdiction are loaded with medical malpractice
cases of all kinds, and medical and legal journals frequently publish articles discussing a wide variety of problems related to medical malpractice. Anyone interested in studying any phase of medical malpractice can find an almost inexhaustible and constantly increasing body of literature on the subject.
But on the subject of attorneys' malpractice the literature is surprisingly
meager;' the appellate cases are relatively few; and it is probably safe to say
that the great majority of lawyers have never been sued for malpractice and are
not acquainted with a lawyer who has been sued.
Since there are almost as many lawyers practicing in this country as there
are physicians,2 and since lawyers as a group are probably no more perfect in
the practice of their art than are the physicians and surgeons, the great disparity
in the incidence of malpractice claims in the two professions begs for an analysis
to explain it.
II. Some General Observations
Of course one obvious explanation for the vast number of malpractice suits
against physicians and surgeons, as compared with the relatively small number
of such suits against lawyers, is the plain and simple fact that the errors of physicians and surgeons result in bodily injury, impairment of bodily function, or
death for which there is usually no specific ceiling on monetary damages, and
claimants can always hope for a large award. An attorney's mistake, on the
*
Partner, Smith, Haughey, Rice, Roegge & Gould, Grand Rapids, Michigan; A.B. University of Michigan, 1940; J.D., University of Michigan, 1948.
1 The entire subject of the liability of attorneys for malpractice occupies just 34 pages in
American Jurisprudence2d (7 Am. JuR. 2D Attorneys at Law §§ 167-200 '(1963)). For comparison the liability of physicians and surgeons for malpractice is treated in American jurisprudence 2d in 145 pages (61 Am. JuR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers, §§ 105222 (1972)). Specific comparison of the volume of appellate cases has not been attempted,
but the disparity is undoubtedly greater. Medical malpractice is one of the favorite subjects
for legal seminars, but rarely, if ever, has any significant legal seminar been devoted to lawyers'
malpractice.
2 In Michigan, for instance, there are somewhat more than 12,500 lawyers, about 12,000
M.D.'s and about 3,000 D.O.'s.

[Vol. 48: 888]

LAWYERS' MALPRACTICE

other hand, is more likely to result in a limited loss of money or property. Money
and property simply do not occupy the sacred position in our society enjoyed by
life and health. People seemingly have a tendency to take the loss of money or
property with a minimum of concern compared with the normally intense reaction to an insult to life, limb or health.
Another rather obvious factor, which our friends in the medical profession
are quick to point out, is that all lawsuits are handled by lawyers, and tried in
courts wherein the judges are lawyers, and all the rules are made largely by
lawyers. With all the apparatus for adjudicating malpractice liability under the
control of lawyers, the embattled medical profession tends to look at this factor
for an explanation for the relatively safe haven enjoyed by lawyers in the
area of malpractice.
In this article we will be examining some of the lawyers' malpractice cases
to determine the degree to which lawyers have enjoyed a favored position in the
law of malpractice, some of the reasons and justifications for that situation, and
what some of the trends may be for the future.
III. A Look at History
It should be noted at the outset that one obviously cannot get a fair impression of the frequency of malpractice claims against attorneys by examining appellate case reports. Obviously there is and always has been a substantial body
of claims against lawyers for malpractice that never reach the appellate courts.3
Many of these involve the rather obvious inadvertent and essentially clerical
errors which most lawyers worry about, wherein the liability is quite obvious.
Presumably most such claims are settled either without suit, or at the trial court
level. When attorneys think of malpractice in connection with themselves, they
usually think in terms of these essentially clerical hazards arising in any active
law office, such as:
Failing to start a suit on behalf of a client within the time allowed
by the statute of limitations.
Failing to answer a suit on behalf of a client so as to avoid the
entry of a judgment by default.
Failure to take the necessary timely steps to perfect an appeal.
Failure to timely file a claim on behalf of a client in a bankruptcy
or probate or similar proceeding.
Failure to record a deed or mortgage or other document affecting
title to real estate or chattels.
Making an error in a legal description in a deed or mortgage.
Failure to discover a material title defect when rendering an
opinion on title to real estate.
Errors and delays in preparation, execution or filing of documents.
3 Of course the same can be said with respect to medical malpractice cases. I know of
no figures to prove it, but I would suspect that a greater proportion of lawyers' malpractice
cases are settled without trial than medical malpractice cases.
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Other errors and omissions which should be avoidable by a careful
lawyer.
Every lawyer is aware of these hazards, and is aware that he can incur
liability to a client when such mistakes arise. Except as to assessment of damages
this type of mistake presents no great problem in the law of malpractice, and
their frequency cannot be judged by the number of cases in the appellate reports.
Of course this type of inadvertent mistake is more or less akin to that class
of cases involving physicians and surgeons where an obvious mistake has been
made through inadvertence such as amputating the wrong leg. There can be
no real room to dispute that a mistake was made. There is little or no valid
justification for the error. The real dispute is usually as to the damages sustained.
Historically, most of the lawyers' malpractice cases involve this general type
of inadvertent mistake.' Liability of a lawyer arising from his fair and honest
and considered exercise of professional judgment, on the other hand, has been
relatively infrequent.
As even a cursory glance at the medical malpractice literature will reveal,
physicians are frequently held liable for malpractice in situations in which they
made no inadvertent error; they made no blundering mistake; and there was no
lack of attention to the patient. The typical medical malpractice claim is more
likely to arise from a situation in which the physician made, or is claimed to
have made, an earnest, good-faith error of professional judgment in making a
diagnosis or in providing treatment. In many medical malpractice cases it cannot really be said that the physician did something by mistake that he knows very
well he should not have done, or that he failed to do something that he knows
very well he ought to have done. Certainly in a large proportion of the medical
malpractice cases the accused doctor can and usually does very plausibly claim
that his actions with respect to his patient were taken as the result of his considered and deliberate exercise of his best professional judgment, and the lawsuit arises usually because some other physician feels that the defendant's professional judgment was wrong.
It is certainly not uncommon for a physician faced with a malpractice
judgment against him, affirmed on appeal, to continue to honestly assert that his
diagnosis and treatment were proper, and he would repeat it if a similar situation
should arise. And other good doctors will agree with him.
Indeed, it is fairly common in a medical malpractice trial to hear the plaintiff's counsel tell the jury in argument that the defendant is a good, conscientious
doctor who did his best for the plaintiff, but unfortunately he was mistaken in
his diagnosis or treatment, as plaintiff's experts have so convincingly explained;
4 The cases usually speak of the attorney's duty in terms of exercising reasonable care
and diligence, and the exercise of good faith, sound professional judgment, but in most cases
the actual error turns out to be essentially clerical, or one arising from ignorance of a clear
rule of law established by statute, rule, or settled decision. Although clear and specific requirements of the law can be overlooked because of ignorance on the part of the lawyer, as
opposed to a clerical oversight, such error certainly is not the result of a considered exercise
of professional judgment. It's a type of mistake the lawyer can explain, but it is difficult to
justify. It is more charitable to include this type of error under the general classification of
inadvertence.
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and in all justice the good doctor should help the patient bear the burdens of
the resulting injury. And the good doctor often does so, at the command of the

jury.
Lawyers are also sued occasionally for claimed errors of good faith professional judgment, but on a comparative basis the cases are infrequent and they
are generally defeated. The more typical malpractice charge against the lawyer
is based on some sort of mistake that the lawyer never intended to make, and
would not have made except for some inadvertence, and is not likely to repeat.
This apparent favored position of the legal profession in the field of malpractice is something that attorneys handling malpractice litigation are constantly reminded of by the physician defendants with whom they come in contact in the prosecution or defense of medical malpractice cases. Is this favored
position simply the result of the control of the judicial apparatus by lawyers?
Is there justification for it? Will it, and should it continue?
There has been little discussion in the cases or in the general literature of
lawyers' malpractice from the point of view suggested by those provocative
questions, which are posed from time to time in various forms by embittered
doctors to their attorneys. It is to these questions that this article is principally
addressed.
IV. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Although lawyers enjoy relative immunity in many areas of malpractice,
they also have their own cross to bear. There is a class of cases which is frequently analyzed in terms of attorneys' malpractice, and properly so, but which
involve an added important element of the breach of some fiduciary duty owed
by a lawyer.' Such cases usually involve ethical considerations peculiar to the
legal profession. They frequently arise from good faith inadvertence, mistake, or
ignorance on the part of the lawyer. But they certainly represent an area in
which lawyers are likely to be held liable for actions which would be permitted
to others. Lawyers do not enjoy a favored position in this area; on the contrary
they are judged by more stringent rules. Because of the unique ethical standards
adopted by, or imposed upon the legal profession, this class of case represents a
phase of professional malpractice in which attorneys are peculiarly vulnerable.
Because of elements of fraud (or constructive fraud) involved in most of these
cases, they do not really fit the definition of malpractice as the term is being used
5 This is probably the most frequent type of case in which lawyers are involved as
litigants. Typical of the Michigan cases are: Dean v. Radford, 141 Mich. 36, 104 N.W. 329
(1905), where an attorney failed to make a timely interest payment on behalf of a client from
funds left with the attorney for that purpose; Olitkowski v. St. Casimer's Saving and Loan
Ass'n, 302 Mich. 303, 4 N.W.2d 664 (1942), where the attorney advised the deposit of
fiduciary funds in an unauthorized depository in which the attorney had an undisclosed
interest, and the depository failed; Storm v. Eldridge, 336 Mich. 424, 58 N.W.2d 129 (1953),
where the attorney was also a real estate broker, and seemed to be acting in both capacities;
Walter v. Pierson, 359 Mich. 161, 101 N.W.2d 289 (1960), another case of an attorney
engaged in the real estate business; and Kukla v. Perry, 361 Mich. 311, 105 N.W.2d 176
(1960), where an attorney engaged in business transactions with his client without revealing
personal adverse interests. All of these and many, many other cases include elements of fraud,
constructive fraud, or breach of ethics.
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for the purpose of this article. Nevertheless they are frequently analyzed by the
courts as malpractice cases and seem to constitute the largest number of appellate
cases involving attorneys. Typical of these cases are situations in which an
attorney enters into an ordinary business relationship with his client, or acts on
behalf of his client in the conduct of some business transaction which the client
might have conducted himself. He is really acting as a businessman rather than
as a lawyer, but he happens to be a lawyer and one of the parties with whom he
is dealing happens to be his client. This general class of case is pointed out principally to eliminate it from our consideration, and to point out that in this fairly
frequent type of case the attorney is likely to be judged by a more strict standard
than others, because of the peculiar fiduciary relationship between himself and
his client.
V. Obvious, Inadvertent Errors
We have listed above some of the more obvious mistakes that an attorney
is likely to make in the conduct of his practice. These axe situations where he
knows better (or certainly ought to know better) and the error generally results
from inattention or clerical error, as distinguished from a considered exercise of
professional judgment. In this class of cases the courts generally have no difficulty in deciding that the lawyer is guilty of malpractice, and the issues litigated
are more likely to center on questions of damages, and whether the party suffering the damages is one to whom the attorney owes a duty.
Where the attorney's error is in connection with litigation (for instance
failing to start suit within the time allowed by the statute of limitations, failing
to take the necessary timely steps for appeal, or failing to answer a suit so as to
avoid a default)' the problem is generally whether the client sustained damages,
and if so the amount thereof. If an attorney has been retained to commence a
suit on behalf of his client, but for some reason fails to commence suit within
the time allowed by the statute of limitations although having the opportunity
to do so, the courts appear to generally agree that the burden is upon the claimant to prove not only the duty and default of duty on the part of the attorney,
but he must also assume the burden to show that the lawsuit which his attorney
sacrificed to the statute of limitations would have been successful if timely commenced.' He does not make a prima facie case simply by demonstrating that the
attorney was responsible for permitting the statute of limitations to be a bar to
his claim. And the burden imposed upon the plaintiff is not merely to demonstrate the damages which he could have proved in the underlying litigation, but,
possibly of even more importance, he must prove that he would have been entitled to recover damages in the underlying litigation.8
6 For the purpose of the present discussion, this type of error is best limited to the
obvious, demonstrable, unarguable mistake.
7 See generally Annot., 45 A.L.R. 2d 22 (1956).
8 A rather dramatic example of the effect of the burden of proof rule is Cornelissen v.
Ort. 132 Mich. 294, 93 N.W. 617 (1903). The defendant attorney's liability for failure to
perfect an appeal was limited as a matter of law to fees incurred by the plaintiff in an unsuccessful effort to obtain a delayed appeal, where plaintiff evidently thought he had made a
prima facie case for the value of the land that he lost due to the failure of the attorney to per-
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This situation gives to the attorney who is obviously guilty of malpractice
many opportunities to completely escape liability, upon the ground that the
claimant is unable to demonstrate that the claim lost to the statute of limitations
would not have been lost anyway on the merits of the claim.
But does the assignment of such a burden of proof to the plaintiff in such
a case give to the attorney a more favorable rule of law than is enjoyed by any
other tort feasor? There is certainly nothing unusual about assigning to the
plaintiff in a tort case not only the burden of proving the defendant's basic liability, but also the burden of proving the fact of damage and the amount thereof.
The only difference would appear to be that in the ordinary tort case, including
cases of medical malpractice, the existence of some damage is fairly evident.
Nevertheless, an attorney defending himself against a client whose claim
he lost to the statute of limitations has some advantages which would not have
been available to the defendant the client wanted to sue. He ordinarily will
have consulted extensively with the client, and will have learned not only the
strengths of his client's claim, but also its weaknesses, and might well be in a
better position to defend on the merits of his client's underlying claim, than the
intended tort feasor would have been.
Examination of the cases fails to suggest any serious assault upon these
rules as to burden of proof in such cases. However, a convincing argument
could be made, with some logical basis, that the burden should be shifted to the
defendant attorney in such cases to demonstrate that the client's cause of action
(which the attorney lost to an avoidable technical rule such as the statute of
limitations) was not a meritorious claim. Although the analogy may not be
completely appropriate, the res ipsa loquitur cases would suggest the theory.'
The attorney in such a case will presumably have advised his client that there is
at least some basis to proceed against the intended defendant, with some hope of
recovery, or he should not have accepted the retainer. Therefore, it might not
be too unreasonable to require the attorney to prove the lack of merit in the
claim he encouraged his client to pursue. Of course as a practical matter, in
this kind of situation, the assignment of the burden of proof on such an issue
probably does not have any overriding importance, except in the occasional
situation in which the parties both avoid offering proof on the issue, hoping to
prevail on the strict legal issue of who had the burden to proceed.'0 Once the
fect an appeal. A rare example of a case wherein the claimant, whose case was lost by the attorney to the statute of limitations, was almost completely successful in meeting all of his
burdens of proof, surviving appellate review, is Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 179
N.W.2d 288 (1970). The attorney sacrificed a medical malpractice claim to the two-year
statute of limitations and the plaintiff, assuming the burden of proving two malpractice claims
(against the attorney for his negligence in failing to start suit, and to demonstrate the underlying liability of a psychiatrist in his treatment) obtained a verdict of $157,158.00 against the
lawyer, which was reduced to $100,000.00 upon the appeal.
9 One of the best treatments of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine will be found in 1 FRUMER
& FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.03 (1968).
10 This appears to have been the case in Cornelissen v. Ort, 132 Mich. 294, 93 N.W. 617
(1903). Neither side offered any proof as to the merits of the underlying claim which the
attorney had lost at the trial level, and then had failed to perfect the appeal which he had
himself recommended. The court in that case actually ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover against the attorney for the value of the land, because the ruling of the trial court

in the underlying case was that the plaintiff was not entitled to the land, and since the issue
was not appealed the judgment of the trial court was the law of the case, plaintiff was bound
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parties join battle on an issue, and present their witnesses and make their arguments, and a jury question is established, most trial attorneys take relatively
little comfort from the fact that the other fellow may have the burden of proof.
The situation is not a great deal different in other typical situations of
more or less inadvertent errors, such as failing to properly record a security
document,'1 or failing to discover a title defect in certifying title to real estate. 2
In such cases there may be no damage, and the aggrieved party has the burden
of proving that there was, and how much. But there is typically an added
element in many of the cases involving title opinions on real estate. The party
who really sustains the damage may not be the attorney's client, but some third
party who relied to his detriment on the attorney's erroneous certificate.
VI. Liability to Third Parties
It seems to have been a fairly firm historical rule that an attorney has no
liability for his malpractice, except to his client.'" Yet very frequently, particularly in cases of real estate title opinions, it is someone other than the client
who is damaged. This is one area in which it does seem that attorneys enjoy a
favored position in the law which is difficult to justify as a universal rule.
Very frequently a client will obtain a title opinion on real estate from his
attorney for the specific purpose of demonstrating his ownership of the land in
order to obtain a mortgage loan, or to successfully sell the land. The attorney in
rendering his opinion may be fully aware of the fact that the opinion is needed
to convince some third party of ownership, rather than to reassure the client.
Yet the rule appears to be quite firm that in the absence of an attorney-client
relationship between the parties, there can be no liability on the part of the
attorney for an erroneous title opinion or other similar certificate. 4
There is good reason to believe that this restrictive rule may be weakening,
and may be changed, as perhaps it should at least in some circumstances. There
is certainly plenty of analogous authority to mount an assault on a rule which
universally limits the malpractice liability of the attorney to his client. In every
jurisdiction the courts have recognized that the concept of privity is an anomaly
in tort litigation.' 5 It almost seems unreal in this day and age to recall that not so
long ago the manufacturer of a defective product could be liable only to the purby it, and could have no damages for the loss of land to which he was not entitled. One gets
the impression from the opinion that, regardless of what he might have proved, there was no
way the plaintiff could have won. One would hesitate to put much stock in that reasoning
today.
11 See generally Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 991 (1963).
12 Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1389 (1920).
13 See McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35, 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970), for a recent application of this rule.
14 See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879), where the Supreme Court clearly
ruled that an attorney can be liable on his erroneous title opinion only to his client, although
dissenting justices felt there should be liability to persons other than the client if the attorney knew that his certificate was to be used by the client to obtain a mortgage loan, and it
was given for that purpose. In general agreement with the majority in Savings Bank are
Currey v. Butcher, 37 Ore. 380, 61 P. 631 (1900); Dundee Mortgage & Trust Inv. Co. v.
Hughes, 20 F. 39 (C.C.D. Ore. 1884); Kasen v. Morrell, 18 Misc. 2d 158, 183 N.Y.S.2d 928
(Sup. Ct. 1959); Maneri v. Amodeo, 38 Misc. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
15 See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABLiTY § 5.03 (1972).
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chaser, when it was obvious that the hazard of injury because of the defect
extended to anyone who might come in contact with the product."8
Certainly, in most situations the relationship between attorney and client
is a personal one and the attorney's duty is solely to his client, and ordinarily
the attorney should not have to be concerned with the effect his representation
of his client may have on third parties. However, where the attorney renders
opinions with respect to title to real estate, the validity of some corporate action,
or some other matter with clear expectation that specific, identified, or identifiable third parties will rely upon it, there is good reason to make an exception to
the otherwise justifiable rule that only the client can complain.
Indeed, some recent cases certainly suggest the carving out of such an
exception.' 7
Of those which do, an interesting class of cases involves the situation wherein
an attorney has prepared a will for his client which fails of probate because of
an error on the part of the attorney, or where some particular portion of the will
is ineffective for some reason chargeable to the attorney. Ordinarily by the time
the will or some part thereof is demonstrated to be ineffective, the testator is
not around to complain. Those suffering damages are the disappointed beneficiaries who typically enjoyed no client relationship with the attorney, at least
in connection with the drafting of the will. Limiting the liability of the attorney
to the client just about insulates the attorney from any liability for his mistake."8
Quite a number of these cases have arisen in California, where it would
appear that at least in this class of cases the attorney can be held liable to a third
party-the disappointed legatee. '" It is very difficult to find much fault with
this extension of liability to a non-client, provided it is limited to the situation
where the trouble clearly arises from the attorney's error and not from a dispute
between the disappointed legatee and the attorney as to how the testator intended
to dispose of his property in his will.
Permitting the legatee or beneficiary to sue the draftsman of the will should
not be countenanced as a vehicle to litigate a dispute as to the testator's inten16 It was not until 1916, with the famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) that the automobile manufacturer was held liable to the
retail purchaser of the automobile for negligence in manufacture causing injury. And even
after that logjam was broken, it took quite a while for the courts generally to get rid of the
concept of "privity" in connection with product liability. See generally 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTs LmiLTy § 5.01 (1964).
17 For an interesting and provocative discussion of this general subject see Note, Public
Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NorEn DAME LAWYER 588
(1972). The history and trends of the liability of accountants and attorneys to third parties
are traced with respect to their certificates of opinion relied upon by third parties.
18 Most of the cases are collected in Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 1363 (1959) and supplements.
19 See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U. S. 987 (1962), and cases cited therein. Although in Lucas it was held
that the disappointed beneficiary, who was not a client of the attorney, could properly sue the
attorney who drafted the will for his negligence in that connection, recovery was denied because
the court felt that malpractice had not been proved. Other cases recognizing the right of a
disappointed legatee or beneficiary to recover against the attorney who drafted the will, in
certain situations, are Licata v. Specter, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (C.P. 1966) (in-

sufficient number of attesting witnesses); Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 P.
265 (1930) and Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419, (Ct. App.) writ denied, 259 La. 759,
252 So. 2d 455 (1971) (legatee was a subscribing witness and therefore disqualified as a
legatee).
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tions. It should be limited to situations where the testator's intentions, as determined from the terms of the will or trust itself, are frustrated by the attorney's
mistake, as in failing to secure the requisite number of attesting witnesses, allowing a legatee to be an attesting witness, or some other error of form which prevents the execution of the testator's clear purpose. To call into question in a
suit against the attorney, whether the attorney properly interpreted the testator's
intent, would seem to be an unacceptable intrusion into the confidential attorneyclient 0relationship, and it would frustrate the settled law governing wills and

trusts.

2

There is really not much distinction between the case of the ineffective will
and the erroneous real estate certificate. In the case of the will it is obvious
that only intended beneficiaries, and not the testator client, will ever be in a
position to claim damages.21 With respect to real estate title opinions and similar
certificates there may of course be damage sustained by the client, and there are
certainly cases in which the attorney's opinion is intended, by both the attorney
and the client, solely for the use and benefit of the client. In such cases it seems
right and proper that only the client can complain. The title opinion constitutes
personal and confidential advice to the client. Others should seek and rely on
their own counsel. But there are certainly many situations in which an attorney
should and does expect that his certificate will be relied upon by third parties,
and it is prepared for that purpose.
It is submitted that attorneys have no right to expect that the older cases
strictly limiting their liability to clients will continue to be the law. For most
of the functions of an attorney the rule limiting his liability to his client is essential to the maintenance of the basic concept of the attorney-client relationship.
In most situations the attorney is expected to faithfully represent the interest of
his client to the exclusion of any consideration of the effect such representation
may have on third parties. He is expected generally to be the advocate of his
client-to advance the interest of his client to the maximum extent consistent
with law and ethics. This role would be impaired considerably if non-clients
could sue the attorney for damages arising from the attorney's acts on behalf of
his client. Very often the very advantage derived by a client from the services
of his attorney means a proportionate disadvantage to someone else. To open
the gate to such claims would change the lawyer's basic role from advocate to a
sort of informal judge or umpire, paid by one side of a dispute-an entirely unacceptable role.
Except in those isolated instances where the basic intent and purpose of the
20 This problem is suggested by Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 449
P.2d 161 (1969), wherein the principal issue discussed is the application of the statute of
limitations (holding that the statute will not start to run until the death of testator). This
case comes close to holding that the attorney drafting the will can be held liable for misinterpretation of the testator's desires based on proof extraneous to the will. To that extent the
case would appear to state bad law, or could be interpreted to stand for bad law. The subsequent case of Hiemstra v. Huston, 12 Gal. App. 3d 1043, 91 Cal. Rptr. 269 '(1970) states
what would certainly appear to be the better rule that in a suit for malpractice against the
attorney who drew the will the testator's intention and purpose must be gleaned solely from
the will.
21 Of course the still living testator, or even possibly his estate, might conceivably make
claim against the attorney for attorney fees expended for an ineffective will.
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attorney's service is to create rights for specific third parties as in a will or trust,
or to induce specific action on the part of third parties as is often the case with
the lawyer's certificate, his liability should be limited strictly to his client.
VII. Considered Professional Judgment
All of the situations which we have discussed so far relate to the lawyer's
liability for errors and omissions which are fairly obvious, and whether inadvertent or not, there can be little doubt that a mistake was made. Usually, when
it can be demonstrated beyond any room for argument that the attorney made a
mistake, the error is essentially clerical or inadvertent. The lawyer often has an
explanation for it, but little excuse. A careful, informed lawyer simply would not
have made the mistake, and the accused lawyer generally looks to the damage
issues for his defense.
A. Clear Errors of ProfessionalJudgment
There are many situations in which a lawyer makes no blunder, there is no
inadvertence, and no ignorance of the law, yet he is ultimately proved to have
been wrong. A lawyer may be called upon to advise a client as to the state of the
law on an issue as to which there is no clear statute or decision upon which he
can rely. He must make an informed judgment as to what a court will do with
an issue that has not as yet been litigated. Later events can of course prove him
to have been wrong, and his client may sustain a loss. In such situations the attorney's carefully considered professional judgment was clearly wrong, yet the
courts will almost always exonerate the attorney from malpractice liability in
that type of situation. The rule has been variously stated by many courts in a
variety of situations, but the statement set forth below sums it up:
If an attorney acts in good faith and in an honest belief that his acts
and advice are well founded and in the best interest of his client, he is not
held liable for a mere error of judgment. A fortiori, an attorney is not liable
for an error in judgment on points of new occurrence or of nice or doubtful
construction, or for a mistaken opinion on a point of law that has not been
settled by a court of last resort and on which reasonable doubt may well be
entertained by informed lawyers. And an attorney has no liability when he
follows a decision of the highest court of his jurisdiction and the decision is
later reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States [footnotes
omitted]. 22
A very interesting case of this character involved a will incorporating a
testamentary trust in which the trust failed in establishment because of violation
of the California rule against perpetuities.2" After holding that the disappointed
beneficiaries of the trust could sue the attorney who drafted the will in spite of
the fact that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, the court went
on to hold that there was no liability on the part of the attorney who drew the
22
23

7 Am. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 170 (1963).
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961).
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will, in spite of the fact that he misunderstood the rule against perpetuities. The
court held, in effect, that an attorney cannot be held liable for malpractice merely
for failure to fully understand all of the very technical ramifications of such a
complicated and difficult and misunderstood rule.24
There have been many other situations in which courts have exonerated
attorneys because of misconceptions as to specific legal requirements, although
usually they are situations in which the state of the law is genuinely in doubt, and
is made certain only by subsequent decision.2" There are all kinds of situations in
which attorneys give advice to their clients as to what they feel the law is, or is
likely to be, when it is not simply a problem of looking up the provisions of some
statute, or an appellate court case that has dearly announced the rule, but on the
contrary it is a matter of attempting to predict what some court is likely to do in
the future with a legal issue that it has not yet faced. In most situations of this
type, the courts have exonerated the attorney from malpractice in connection
with his advice which has proven to have been erroneous. The rationale generally
is that where the appellate courts of different jurisdictions disagree on the rule to
be applied, or when the judges on a particular court are unable to agree unanimously on what the rule should be, an attorney cannot be expected to be infallible in such cases."
Most attorneys, of course, when called upon to render an opinion on some
unsettled point of law, will carefully point out that the issue is unsettled, and
that no absolute answer to the issue can be given until the issue is resolved by
the appropriate court, but nevertheless their client is going to act some way or
other on the basis of the attorney's advice. But rarely will he win a malpractice
case against the attorney when the attorney's guess proves to be wrong.
24 It is not entirely clear, in the Lucas case, whether the attorney did not understand the
rule against perpetuities, or whether some phase of that rule was unsettled in California at the time he prepared the will. The opinion can probably be interpreted either way.
In any event, for one indoctrinated in the law of medical malpractice it seems at least mildly
surprising that the client has not at least made out a factual issue of malpractice upon demonstrating that the attorney's advice proved to be clearly and unarguably wrong. It is certainly
a risky business to predict what the law will be several years hence on an unsettled, close
issue of law, but as between the attorney and his client, at least on an issue such as was
presented in Lucas, the client must rely on his attorney.
25 See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5, § 3 [6] (1956).
26 The attitude of the courts on this subject has not changed much since Babbitt v.
Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N.W. 417 (1889) where an attorney suing for his fees was met
with the defense of malpractice. The court said:
A lawyer is not an insurer of the result in a case in which he is employed, unless
he makes a special contract to that effect, and for that purpose. Neither is there
any implied contract, when he is employed in a case, or any matter of legal business,
that he will bring to bear learning, skill, or ability beyond that of the average of his
profession. Nor can more than ordinary care and diligence be required of him, without a special contract made requiring it. Any other rule would subject his rights
to be controlled by the vagaries and imaginations of witnesses and jurors, and not
infrequently to the errors committed by courts.
Id. at 337-38, 41 N.W. at 418-19.
The court goes on to point out that able attorneys frequently differ on interpretation
of statutes, rules, contracts, and court decisions, and continues:
Under such circumstances, the errors which may be made by them must be
very gross before the attorney can be held responsible. They should be such as to
render wholly improbable a disagreement among good lawyers as to the character of
the services required to be performed, and as to the manner of their performance
under all of the circumstances in the given case, before such responsibility attaches.
Id. at 338, 41 N.W. at 419.
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This certainly constitutes a limitation on the lawyer's malpractice liability
which is not found, at least to the same degree, in the field of medicine. In a
comparable situation the physician may escape liability, but rarely as a matter of
law. If the physician escapes liability for his educated bad guess, it is more likely
to be on a factual determination by the trier of fact that he was not negligent.
With the attorney, he is likely to escape liability as a matter of law.
There is undoubtedly ample justification for such a difference in attitude,
because of the very nature of the problems faced by lawyers in this area. There
is simply nothing very scientific about the law. It is not governed by the inexorable rules of nature. Although there is some degree of symmetry to the law, and
broad trends can frequently be detected, it is an extremely risky business to
prognosticate what a particular jurisdiction is likely to do next on a particular
narrow issue. Nevertheless the layman has no other resource for his guidance in
such matters except his lawyer, and he expects and should expect competent
professional advice and guidance even on the toughest issues, where he needs it
most.
Probably the only real philosophical justification for protecting the lawyer
from malpractice in such situations is plainly and simply the extremely difficult,
and next to impossible problem which the lawyer faces in attempting to anticipate
unpredictable courts and legislatures. It would almost seem that if the lawyer in
such situations has presented to his client a reasonably fair review of the factors
involved in the guessing game, then from that point on the client is in about as
good a position to guess what the law will be as is his lawyer. Such might be an
acceptable basis for testing the lawyer's discharge of his duty to his client, but
the test applied by most of the cases seems to be more protective to the lawyer.
If the issue is genuinely in doubt and unresolved, so that "good lawyers" might
reasonably differ as to how the issue is likely ultimately to be resolved, then generally the lawyer is protected from malpractice.
B. Debatable Errors of ProfessionalJudgment
Beyond the class of cases where the attorney can be demonstrated to have
been clearly wrong, although on an arguable and debatable issue of law (wherein the attorney usually escapes liability), there is a further class of situations, most
likely to develop in the conduct of litigation, in which an attorney may be said to
have exercised poor professional judgment, or to have demonstrated a lack of
skill, from which his client sustained a loss.
There are all kinds of situations that can be imagined where the considered,
good faith, honest judgment or technique of an attorney might be called into
question. Every lawyer having any degree of contact with litigation is aware of
situations wherein an attorney has used bad judgment in the preparation or
conduct of a trial or an appeal. Perhaps he has lost a case he should have won
or at least he obtained a poorer result than the real merits of his case deserved.
He may have induced his client to pay more in settlement than other competent
attorneys think the case was worth. He may have advised the refusal of a
"reasonable offer of settlement" and proceeded to try the case and lose it. He.
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may have elected not to call certain witnesses available to him where other
lawyers might feel he should have called them. He can ask that "one question too
many" in cross-examination of a hostile witness which the trial symposium
lecturers frequently caution us about. The possibilities for exercising a good faith
judgment which other attorneys will consider wrong are endless. Everyone's hindsight is better than his foresight and the results of many trials would be different
if the attorneys could start over again. Certainly based on the typical conversations in attorneys' lounges, it would not be hard to find a lawyer to point out the
situations where some other lawyer used bad judgment or technique in the conduct of litigation. Certainly the skills brought to bear by lawyers in the courtrooms are no better, on the average, than the skills brought to bear by physicians
and surgeons in the treatment of their patients. Yet one must search to find cases
in the appellate reports where lawyers are accused of this type of bad judgment,
and it is rare indeed to find a case where an award of damages is affirmed as a
result of a good faith and conscientious exercise of professional judgment, which
is wrong only in the eyes of some other lawyer.
A 1959 case in Minnesota involved several professional judgments of an
attorney conducting litigation which were called into question by his disappointed
client, and the court's opinion is as typical of the attitude of the courts in cases
of this class as can be found.2" The dispute arose in the first place when the attorneys sued for the balance of their fees, which also is rather typical. A good
proportion of the situations in which attorneys are accused of malpractice in this
sense seem to be initiated by this route. The client was a defendant in a personal
injury suit arising from an elevator accident. The attorney advised the client that
he thought the client was probably liable, and he should attempt to settle the
case, and an attempt was made to settle the case which was unsuccessful because
another defendant, separately represented, refused to participate in the settlement. The attorney therefore denied liability on the part of his client and the
case went to trial and resulted in a verdict against all of the defendants. The
client objected to paying fees because the attorney had advised that the client
was liable and would probably lose the case, so that services disputing liability
were unnecessary; he complained that the attorney mishandled the trial by failing
to object to certain inadmissible evidence; in offering certain evidence; and in
making certain arguments to the jury. Many of the charges seem frivolous, but
of course there are a lot of frivolous claims in litigation that are left to juries to
decide.
The court disposed of all these grounds as legal issues. As to the decision
to go to trial and defend the case on all issues, the court said:
A conscientious lawyer usually gives his client a frank appraisal of any
hazards faced by him as a defendant in a lawsuit. When he points out the
hazards of a tort action brought against his client by expressing an opinion
that his client will lose on the issue of liability, it does not necessarily follow
that liability exists as a matter of law, or that regardless of the surrounding
circumstances, liability may not be properly denied for the purpose of having
an adjudication on the merits and this is especially true when that issue
27

Meagher v. Kavali, 256 Minn. 54, 97 N.W.2d 370 (1959).
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must, in any event, be litigated as to codefendants. Any realistic considera-

tion of the circumstances in this case leads to the conclusion that plaintiffs

were not negligent and that they adopted an ethical, reasonable, and prudent
course for the protection of the interest of their clients. The trial court did
not err in so instructing the jury.28
The attorney had taken an appeal from the adverse decision in the trial
court in the underlying case and the client complained that the appeal was unwarranted since the attorney had advised that the client was probably liable and
would probably lose the appeal. Because the codefendants had appealed, the
court agreed that the appeal in question was reasonable and appropriate as a
hedge against the possibility the codefendants might prevail.
It was claimed that the attorney was guilty of malpractice for failing to
object to inadmissible evidence. It had apparently been ruled by a divided court
on the appeal of the underlying case that the evidence was inadmissible, but that
there was no error because no objection. On this"point the court quoted from a
North Carolina case:
An attorney who acts in good faith and in an honest belief that his
advice and acts are well founded and in the best interest of his client is not
answerable for a mere error in judgment or a mistake in a point of law which
has not been settled by the court of last resort in his State and on which
reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers. 29
Clearly, the Minnesota court had no intention of leaving to a jury the opportunity to second-guess the attorney on questions of professional judgment and
trial tactics which arise every day in every lawsuit. Although this is the usual
attitude, situations can be found where lawyers have been subject to the possibility of malpractice liability on matters of tactics, but such situations appear to
be rather gross, with the motivation of the attorney open to some question.
Ethical considerations are usually involved."0
In a 1966 case arising in the seventh circuit, an attorney lost a malpractice
claim to his client in the trial court, but won on appeal."' The attorney had conducted a substantial personal injury suit on behalf of his client, and suffered a
verdict of no cause for action after eight days of trial, which was finally affirmed
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois. When the client sued the attorney
for malpractice he alleged a variety of things: negligent preparation and presentation of the case, negligent preparation for and presentation of the testimony
28 Id. at 58-59, 97 N.W.2d at 374.
29 Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 520, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1954).
30 See Suritz v. Kelner, 155 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1963). An attorney was retained by a
man who was injured in an industrial accident to bring suit for personal injuries against a
third party (other than his employer) but failed to act promptly and the workmen's compensation carrier brought the suit as allowed by the Workmen's Compensation Law. Apparently hoping that that suit would be dismissed so that he could start suit on behalf of the injured
man himself, the attorney instructed his client not to answer interrogatories addressed to him
in the suit started by the WC carrier. Much to his chagrin, the dismissal was "with prejudice" and his client's claim was lost. The court held that a jury question was presented on
this particular exercise of trial tactics.
31 Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488 (1966) (an appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Illinois).
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of several witnesses, failing to seek proper counsel and advice and assistance
during the course of trial, failing to make proper preparations for and conducting a poor opening statement and closing argument to the jury, negligently failing
to inform the plaintiff of his limited trial experience, advising plaintiff that the
only issue to be resolved in the case was the damages, failing to communicate a
settlement offer of $75,000.00, and failing to conduct proper settlement negotiations. At the trial of the malpractice case all of the above issues were disposed of
by directed verdict by the trial judge except the last two, which were submitted
to the jury. The jury awarded the client $75,000.00. There is no discussion by
the appellate court of the numerous issues on which a verdict was directed, and
the appellate court finally reversed the case, ruling that a verdict should also have
been directed on the last two issues. The specific basis for the appellate court's
ruling was the lack of any expert testimony to support the plaintiff's charges, but
one suspects on reading the opinion that if plaintiff had sworn an expert to support his charges of malpractice the court would have thought of something else.
The court closed its opinion as follows:
We are not unmindful of the importance of the issue presented, not
only to the parties but to all attorneys engaged in the practice of law. We
are obligated to follow the reasoning of the Illinois courts and do so freely
because we think the rule which requires expert testimony in a suit such as
this is wholesome. If a judgment against an attorney, on a record such as
is before us, can be justified, the legal profession would be more hazardous
than the law contemplates. An attorney could hardly afford to take the
chance of communicating with his client by any means other than in
writing or by having a record made of every conversation between them.
Otherwise, he would be amenable to an action for damages, oft-times by a
client disgruntled because of an unfavorable result, with no way to disprove the client's version of what took place.
We hold that the court erred in its refusal to3 2allow defendant's motion
for a directed verdict. The judgment is reversed.
It is not clear from the opinion in that case just what the evidence was with
respect to the issues presented to the jury, relating to settlement negotiations. Presumably the attorney testified that he communicated the $75,000.00 offer to the
client, and the client denied it. The court does not comment on whether the
attorney had an obligation to communicate that offer, but it is hard to believe
that any court could excuse an attorney for not communicating a $75,000.00
offer to his client in a personal injury case, whatever an expert witness might
say about it. One suspects that the court was simply unwilling to believe that the
offer was not communicated, in spite of the client's denial.
With respect to the failure to communicate a good faith, realistic and serious
offer of settlement to his client, one would assume that the attorney's obligation
is so dear, at least in the average situation, that liability would follow if the
client could demonstrate his damages. Certainly circumstances can be imagined
where the attorney would be under no duty or obligation to communicate a
settlement offer, as where from prior discussions with the client, the attorney had
32 Id. at 493-94.
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good reason to believe that the client would refuse the offer. But the failure to
communicate to the client a sincere and reasonable offer of settlement can hardly
be said to be an erroneous exercise of professional judgment by an attorney. It
would be more like pigheadedness.
The plain fact is that one simply cannot find any significant cases in the
appellate reports in which the court has actually approved a substantial award
against an attorney based upon a conscientious and intelligent exercise of professional judgment-a case where it is impossible to nail down an absolute rule
and one must rely on some other attorney's judgment to say that the defendant
was wrong. Does this really put the attorney in a favored position as compared
to other professionals? If so, is there a justification for it?
VIII. Rationale of the Lawyer's Favored Position
As to the first question, the answer is very probably yes. The attorney does
enjoy a favored position in the law of malpractice, particularly in this important
area of the exercise of professional judgment in situations in which there is no
absolute answer to a problem. Although statements of the law can be found
which would appear to evenhandedly apply the same rules to lawyers and
doctors, nevertheless when it comes down to the nitty-gritty of a particular case,
the lawyer appears to escape liability unless it can be shown that his action, whatever it was, was clearly and demonstrably wrong, and not merely called into question by some other lawyer who has a different opinion of it. The favored position
is not so much in the stating of the rules of law, but in applying them to particular
cases. There undoubtedly are cases disposed of at the trial court level, and cases
disposed of without trial, in which lawyers have paid for the types of bad judgment that we are discussing. Some of the appellate cases represent borderline
situations on the classifications that we have used. But certainly the broad picture
is that lawyers incur far less risk of malpractice in their day-to-day professional
judgments (provided they are ethical and honest, and don't overlook a specific
statute or clear and obvious rule or requirement of the law), than do other
professionals. What, if any, is the justification?
In connection with adversary matters generally, and most particularly in the
broad area of litigation and preparation for litigation, one must keep in mind the
peculiar situation of the lawyer, which is really quite different from that of other
professionals.
A physician in undertaking to provide his services to his patient does so by
bringing to bear whatever is calculated to improve the condition of his patient.
But the patient is not in competition with anyone else. What helps the patient
does not automatically hurt someone else. Everyone connected with the patient
is interested in his good health, and no one will be damaged or disappointed by
the success of the physician in treating his patient. If several physicians are involved with a single patient they are in a position to cooperate and work jointly
for a single end: provide the proper diagnosis and treatment for the patient.
With the attorney, on the other hand, particularly in connection with litigation,
whether possible, threatened, or pending, the client is in competition with some-
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one else. The client's rights are balanced by someone else's obligations. To the
extent the attorney improves the position or standing of his client, he proportionately diminishes the standing and position of another.
Every attorney has the obligation to put forth his best efforts for his client,
and in an adversary proceeding to present his client's case in the best possible light,
consistent with applicable law, procedures, and ethics. While he is doing that,
some other attorney is doing the same thing for the client's adversary. In most
litigation, someone has to lose. Not everyone can win. And as long as we maintain the adversary system of litigation, an attorney will, and should, present his
client's case and define his client's rights and obligations in the light most favorable to the client, provided there is a reasonable basis in the law to maintain that
position. Under these circumstances attorneys must be given great leeway in the
exercise of judgment and in the giving of advice to clients, without fear of a
malpractice claim if they turn out to be wrong.
In just about every lawsuit there are one or more winners, and one or more
losers. If the case was worth litigating in the first place, we must conclude that
there was more than one way the case could have come out. Otherwise, the
parties should have made a settlement. There is certainly nothing very scientific
about trial tactics or guessing what juries will do. There is not much more basis
to guess what a judge will do on issues of fact, and the flood of cases in the appellate reports demonstrates how frequently attorneys can be mistaken as to what
judges will do on questions of law. When attorneys are engaged in such guessing
games, it is unrealistic to hold them liable for a bad guess.
On the other hand, the medical profession is essentially scientific. To a large
degree specific combinations of symptoms indicate certain things, and particular
treatments, under given conditions, have predictable results. A well-informed
physician can usually make a better prognosis as to what will result from a course
of treatment than the most skillful trial attorney attempting to predict the result
of a lawsuit.
There are undoubtedly lots of reasons why lawyers are subject to far less
frequent malpractice claims than doctors, and basic control of the apparatus of
adjudication is undoubtedly one of them. The "conspiracy of silence" often
attributed to the medical profession in malpractice matters certainly has its
counterpart in the legal profession. Lawyers are inclined to discourage claims
against other lawyers for malpractice, just as physicians are inclined to discourage medical malpractice claims. However, lawyers are in a much better
position to limit claims against themselves as a group than are the physicians.
The apparatus for starting the suit, whether against a doctor or a lawyer, is in
the hands of the lawyers. This is the point at which claims can be most effectively
discouraged. Once a suit is started, witnesses can be subpoenaed and a "conspiracy of silence" can usually be overcome. A lawyer is needed to commence
and prosecute a case and this factor is undoubtedly an unavoidable depressant
upon malpractice claims against lawyers. 3 But this factor is balanced, to some
33 It is recognized that in most jurisdictions, at least, individuals can represent themselves in court, and are not absolutely required to retain a lawyer. But it is not often done
except in small claims courts.
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degree, by the fact that with respect to a large part of the work that an attorney
does there are other attorneys with an adverse interest who are in a position to
know something about the quality of his service. Other professionals are much
more likely to work alone or in cooperation with their peers, rather than in competition with them.
There seems to be no way to really determine whether all of these factors,
taken together, are likely to encourage or discourage malpractice claims against
lawyers. Perhaps the best explanation for the relative dearth of cases against
lawyers is the rather marked lack of success of those who have brought them.
Very likely the basic factors of the marketplace have more bearing on the frequency of lawyers' malpractice cases than the fraternity feeling among members
of the bar.
The more important question is whether the relative immunity of lawyers
with respect to certain types of malpractice claims is justifiable from the point
of view of society as a whole. Here again, the basically adversary nature of the
legal profession, which is unique among all the professions, is the important
overriding factor which both explains and justifies the favored position enjoyed
by lawyers in the field of professional malpractice. As has already been pointed
out lawyers are dealing generally with rights and liabilities of their clients which
are in competition with reciprocal liabilities and rights of others. By the very
nature of things in adversary matters, a lawyer only rarely can accomplish for his
client everything which the client has set his sights on, but to the extent that he
does so it is usually at the expense of someone else whose lawyer, in the eyes of
his client has failed. If a suit for malpractice could be maintained against an
attorney whenever some other lawyer felt his professional advice was poor or his
skills as an advocate below par, there would be one or more potential malpractice
cases arising from just about every lawsuit, as well as many other business and
commercial disputes. Obviously not all such potential claims would be sued
upon. Nevertheless if jury issues could be anticipated in that kind of situation
there would probably be an adequate number of lawyers available to sue the
claims against their fellows on contingent fee contracts. So long as the courts
continue to consistently rule that a lawyer is immune from such claims, there is
little to gain, and much time and expense to lose, in starting such a suit. But if
the directed verdicts could be avoided, if jury questions could be expected as to
the lawyers' good faith judgment calls, lawyers would certainly be sued for malpractice much more frequently than they are. Certainly, if such matters were
jury issues there would be many more potential lawyers' malpractice cases than
medical malpractice cases. By the very nature of things a very large percentage
of people requiring legal services end up disappointed in the sense that they
have not achieved, as against their adversary, what they had hoped to achieve.
In juxtaposition most people accomplish what they set out to achieve when they
consult their physician.
The sheer numbers of potential claims that might be generated against attorneys are staggering, and the impact upon the lawyer's time and energies and
upon our already overloaded courts would be substantial. But more important,
and more sinister, would be the impact on the very structure of the legal profes-
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sion and upon the adversary system of justice. Lawyers are expected to be advocates in many of the most important phases of their work, and the dynamic
development of the law and all of our social and economic relationships depend
to a large extent on the effective performance by the lawyer of his role as advocate. He should not be discouraged by threat of malpractice litigation from
fully performing that role. If he were subject to a suit for malpractice whenever
his client failed to obtain expected (or hoped for) results, the attorney might tend
to become more of a father confessor than advocate-discouraging the legitimate
aspirations of his clients. Society, and the law, might well tend to stagnate.
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the merits or deficiencies of malpractice law as it applies to the medical profession, nor to engineers, architects,
and other disciplines. The physicians feel much abused, and they tend to a substantial degree to blame the lawyers for the situations that they face. But the
solutions to the problems of the medical profession do not lie in spreading those
problems to the legal profession. There are significant differences between the
two professions which must be taken into account in developing policies as to malpractice liability.
IX. Conclusion
It would appear that there are areas where there can be expected to be a
liberalization of the law of malpractice as it applies to lawyers. Particularly, it
would appear that the lawyers' liability is likely to extend beyond his clients in
certain limited situations, as it probably should. It is conceivable that the burden
of proof of certain elements in a malpractice case might reasonably be shifted
to the attorney. But it would certainly seem that if attorneys were subject to a
suit for malpractice for every alleged error of professional judgment that could
be demonstrated by hindsight, or by the opinion of another client's lawyer, we
would have an intolerable situation of one or more potential attorneys' malpractice cases arising from just about every trial in all our courts, the role of the
lawyer as advocate would tend to be discouraged, and the continuing dynamic
development of law and society would be dampened.
The study of this subject was prompted in part by questions posed by many
doctor friends as to why so many doctors are sued for malpractice, and so few
lawyers. When you really get down to examining the literature, the disparity is
quite surprising. When the fraud and breach of trust cases involving lawyers are
eliminated, it is even more amazing. Most lawyers today presumably carry malpractice insurance, and well they should. They are susceptible to many different
kinds of errors which can cause loss to their clients. Insurance companies writing
malpractice insurance for lawyers pay quite a few claims, arising from a variety
of situations, but they are usually the more or less obvious and usually inadvertent mistakes outlined in the earlier part of this article. The small number of
attorneys' malpractice cases reaching the appellate courts is not an indication that
attorneys do not commit malpractice, nor that they avoid liability for their malpractice. Most of the claims against attorneys are for money or property and are
much more easily adjusted as to value than personal injury and death claims
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facing physicians, and undoubtedly a greater proportion of them are settled
before reaching the courts. Certainly in situations with an element of breach of
ethics or breach of fiduciary relationship, lawyers are frequent and vulnerable
targets. But in the broad area of the good faith and conscientious exercise of
professional judgment, particularly in adversary matters, lawyers have traditionally been and should continue to be relatively immune to the risk of malpractice. A significant increase in that risk would have a very great, but unpredictable impact on the adversary system of justice, and the role of the lawyer in
that system.

